Evidence and Confrontation in the President\u27s Military Commissions by Smith, Nicholas W.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 33
Number 1 Fall 2005 Article 3
1-1-2005
Evidence and Confrontation in the President's
Military Commissions
Nicholas W. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas W. Smith, Evidence and Confrontation in the President's Military Commissions, 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 83 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol33/iss1/3
Evidence and Confrontation in the
President's Military Commissions
by NICHOLAS W. SMITH*
I. Origins of the President's Military Order and Commissions
A. Terrorism, Capture and Rule-Making
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked New York City's
World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington and killed
thousands of Americans. Shortly thereafter, President George W.
Bush and his administration began a vigorous offensive against the
terrorist cells responsible for these and other attacks against
Americans. President Bush issued a Military Order directing the
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to capture and take into
custody anyone the President believes is a member of the al Qaida
terror network, suspect of terrorism, or anyone who aids or conspires
with terrorists.' The President holds limitless discretion over which
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; External Managing
Editor, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 2004-2005; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, Santa Barbara, 2002. I would like to thank Professor Roger C.
Park of Hastings for sparking my interest in this topic and for his wisdom and guidance
during the note-writing process. I would also like to thank my wife, Allison, for her
support, and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Editorial Board, 2005-2006, for
bringing this project to fruition.
1. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter
Military Order]. The Military Order covers anyone who the President has reason to
believe:
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described.
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individuals fall under the jurisdiction of his order.2 Those individuals
captured are subject to trial by military commission under the order.
At the time of this writing, approximately 500 detainees of
differing national origin remain at the United States Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba detention facility. Since early 2003, many of the detainees
have been released or transferred to the control of foreign
governments. Prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, Combatant Status Review Tribunals determine whether
a detainees apprehended pursuant to the President's Military Order is
an "enemy combatant."3 The Court in Hamdi held that a "citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."4 Following
classification as enemy combatants, the detainees await a
determination whether they are subject to the President's Military
Order and trial by commission.
Under his executive Military Order,' President Bush directed
Secretary Rumsfeld to promulgate "rules for the conduct of the
proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and
post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and
qualifications of attorneys. 6 On March 21, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld
and the Department of Defense issued Military Commission Order
No. 1, which outlined the system of trial procedure to be used.7 In
Id. § 2(a)(1).
2. See Laurence Tribe & Neal K. Katyal, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1261 (2002).
3. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4. Id. at 533.
5. The Bush Administration has not been expressly authorized by Congress to
create or execute the proposed military commissions. Tribe & Katyal, supra note 2, at
1266. Rather, the President's Military Order promulgates all rules governing jurisdiction
over the detainees and announces the intention to try them by military commission.
Military Order, supra note 1, § 3(b). Tribe and Katyal argue that the Bush
Administration's creation of the commissions without congressional approval is "flatly
unconstitutional." Tribe & Katyal, supra note 2, at 1266. They argue that President Bush
creates, for himself, "tribunals inferior to the United States Supreme Court" when
Congress is expressly granted that power in Article I of the Constitution. Id. In sum, they
argue that President Bush's creation of the commissions "installs the executive branch as
lawgiver as well as law-enforcer, law-interpreter, and law-applier, asserting for the
executive branch the prerogative to revise the jurisdictional design of the system of
criminal justice." Id. at 1265-66.
6. Military Order, supra note 2, § 4(c).
7. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) available at
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addition, the Department issued Military Commission Instructions
providing further guidance on the intricacies of the trials. The Bush
Administration and the Department suffered severe American and
international criticism from the press, interest groups, and scholars
questioning the procedural protections included in the proposed
trials. In response to these criticisms, the Department revised the
Commission Order on August 31, 2005, to further comport with
American civilian and military court standards of trial procedure.8
B. Ongoing Debate over Detainee Status and its Effects on the Military
Commissions
Four detainees have been formally charged with crimes and
preliminary hearings have been held in their cases.9 In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, a federal district court of the District of Columbia enjoined
those four proceedings on November 8, 2004. '0 The court held that
Hamdan could not be tried by military commission since no
"competent tribunal" had determined that he was not a prisoner-of-
war under the Geneva Convention of 1949.11 The court decided that
the aforementioned Combatant Status Review Tribunals created to
determine whether detainees were enemy combatants did not
properly decide whether the detainees were prisoners-of-war under
the 1949 Geneva Convention. 2 Applying Article 102 of the 1949
Convention, the court reasoned that prisoners-of-war can be "validly
sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same
courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power."' 3 American soldiers must
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf; Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003) [hereinafter Commission Order] (to be
codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 9)
8. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 (Aug. 31, 2005) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf; Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003) [hereinafter Commission Order] (to be
codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 9)
9. Press Release, Dep't of Def., "Fourth Military Commission Concludes Week of
Trials" (Aug. 27, 2005) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040827-
1180.html.
10. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. Dist. 2004)
11. Id. at 160-62. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention). The United
States ratified this convention in 1955.
12. 344 F. Supp. 2d at 161-62.
13. 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 11, Art. 102.
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be tried for transgressions of military law by courts-martial, governed
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and its Manual for Courts-
Martial.14 Under the lower court's rationale, the government would
have to try detainees by equivalent procedure, and thus, its decision
effectively precluded detainee trial by military commission. 5
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Hamdan July 15,
2005.16 A three-judge panel held that President Bush operated within
the ambit of his presidential powers when creating the military
commissions and that the 1949 Geneva Convention does not provide
an "enemy combatant" a right to enforce its provisions in court.17 The
court further held that even if the 1949 Geneva Convention does
provide an enforceable right to combatants in court, the combatants
at issue are not "prisoners-of-war" as defined by the convention."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention apply to the
detainees and will hear the case in March of 2006.19
The bases for the rulings in the various detainee cases, thus far,
have been jurisdictional in nature. Only the district court in Hamdan
took issue with the procedural provisions of the Commission Order as
part of its rationale. Even then, most of the language dealing with
the procedural aspects of the commissions is dicta, and the basis for
the court's rationale remains that the detainees are prisoners-of-war
under the 1949 Convention. The Court of Appeals responded to the
lower court's dicta by stating that the issue of proper procedural
provisions in the military commissions cannot be raised by the
detainee until after conviction by commission and all military appeals
have been exhausted. Should the Supreme Court find that the 1949
Convention applies to the detainees, the military commissions will
likely be modified to a system more reminiscent of the American
courts-martial or completely cast aside. However, should the Court
14. See 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
15. 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 11, Art. 102.
16. 415 F. 3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
17. Id. at 40.
18. Id. at 40-41. See 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 11, Art. 4A.
19. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 2922488 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184)
certiorari granted.
20. 34 F. Supp. 2d 152, 1
21. See id.
22. 415 F. 3d at 42-43.
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find that military commissions may properly try detainees, the Court
may clarify the standards of procedural process it will require in the
commissions for purposes of ruling on appealed convictions in the
future.
C. Argument
This note will not attempt to argue whether or not the non-U.S.
citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay should have prisoner-of-war
status. This note will contend that the best course of action for the
Bush Administration is to adopt the same rules and procedures for
the trial phase of the commission proceedings as a trial by courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for all detainees
at Guantanamo Bay. Although it may seem otherwise, this
contention does not essentially intimate that the detainees are
prisoners-of-war. The provisions of the Commission Order have been
assailed by legal scholars and commentators since their creation and
were already altered to meet some of those criticisms on August 31,
2005. This proposition would simply consist of further procedural
alterations to restore public and international confidence in the
American administration of justice for non-U.S. citizens.
This note will examine the current, updated provisions in the
Commission Order and will compare those provisions with the rules
of evidence and procedures followed in American criminal or military
courts. It should be noted that the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C., Ch. 47, including the Manual for Courts-Martial, governs
criminal procedure in military trials." It should also be noted that
President Carter adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence into the
Manual in 1980, styling them the Military Rules of Evidence.
Just as American criminal and military courts afford the accused
a presumption of innocence, the Commission Order purports to do
the same." It promises to provide the accused a copy of the charges
against him, an attorney for his defense, access to evidence that tends
to exculpate him, the choice of testifying, compulsory process to call
witnesses in his favor, and generally open proceedings.26 In addition,
the Commission Order provides an appeals process to review the
23. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. Exec. Order No. 12473 as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12484.
24. See Exec. Order No. 12198 (1980).
25. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 5(a).
26. Id. § 5(a), (b), (d)-(i).
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decisions made in the commissions, with the last stop for appeal to
the President. On the other hand, members of a commission will be
forced to weigh evidence, untested as to veracity and nearly
unfiltered for prejudice, and even secret evidence. In addition, the
ability of the accused to confront witnesses in court will be severely
hampered.
Undoubtedly, these detainees should be tried for their crimes.
However, the process by which they are tried will be scrutinized by
the international community and should therefore set an international
standard for the administration of justice in terror cases. The new
system of trial procedure created by the Commission Order to try
accused terrorists, at the time of this writing, is lacking some of the
most important procedural safeguards for a criminal trial. These
include the exclusion of hearsay evidence, screening evidence for
undue prejudice, and providing the accused an extensive right to
confront witnesses against him.27  Re-evaluating the current
provisions of the commissions against American standards will
increase efficiency, fairness and the integrity of verdicts with the
international community. Specifically, adopting the courts-martial
approach would best cure the procedural and evidentiary departures
from the American standard of criminal justice.
Courts-martial trials could still be held in a military setting to
include the protection of witnesses, military officers and others
present at the trial, as well as prevent escape. Applying principles
from a time-honored, statute-based system of criminal justice that is
reliable and lawful, both domestically and internationally, will
prevent unforeseen issues with the admission of evidence, the
confrontation of witnesses, and the validity of verdicts from arising.
Because these trials have already been highly scrutinized by national
leaders, legal scholars and the press, relying on the system of courts-
martial would provide stability in the chaos involved in finding and
bringing terrorists to justice.
Section II of this Note will summarize important personnel
positions on the military commissions. Section III will compare the
use of classified evidence in American courts with the proposed use
of secret evidence in the military commissions. Section IV will discuss
the Commission Order barriers to confrontation, including provisions
admitting testimonial, hearsay evidence and expressly allowing
anonymous witnesses to testify. Section V will discuss the proposed
27. See Commission Order, supra note 8, § 5(a), (b), (d)-(i).
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use of character evidence against the accused without balancing
safeguards for irrelevant and overly prejudicial evidence. Section VI
will suggest reform that could increase the procedural fairness of the
current military commissions while preserving the Bush
Administration's national security concerns. Section VII will discuss
alternate forums for the detainee cases and alternate options for the
Bush Administration. Section VIII will conclude that it is in the best
interest of the Bush Administration and the U.S. to adopt the courts-
martial proceeding to quell public criticism of the military
commissions, take the high ground from the enemy and to
demonstrate the America's commitment to the rule of law.
II. Military Commission Personnel
In order to understand the provisions and intricacies of the
proposed military commissions, it is useful to examine some of the
important personnel positions. President Bush sits atop the military
commission structure, granting jurisdiction to the commissions over
individuals subject to his Military Order 8 Secretary Rumsfeld,
deriving authority from the Military Order, promulgated the "rules
for the conduct of the proceedings of military commissions, including
pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures., 29  In addition, the
Commission Order grants the Secretary the power to order
commencement of a commission, pick its members and officers, and
to designate his power over the detainees to another person.30 In
Military Commission Order No. 5, Secretary Rumsfeld chose John D.
Altenburg, Jr., as the "Appointing Authority" and granted him
extensive power over commission procedure and personnel. 1
According to the Commission Order, the Appointing Authority
chooses commission personnel, including Presiding Officers,
Members, a Chief Prosecutor, and Chief Defense Counsel.
32
28. Military Order, supra note 1, § 2(a).
29. Id. § 4(c).
30. The Commission Order states: "In accordance with the President's Military
Order, the Secretary of Defense or a designee ('Appointing Authority') may issue orders
from time to time appointing one or more military commissions to try individuals subject
to the President's Military Order and appointing any other personnel necessary to
facilitate such trials." Commission Order, supra note 8, § 2.
31. See Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 5, Designation of Deputy
Secretary of Defense as Appointing Authority (Mar. 15, 2004). Thus, as a procedural
matter, President Bush declares which individuals are subject to the order, while Secretary
Rumsfeld and Altenburg can order the commencement of the commission and choose
commission personnel.
32. See Commission Order, supra note 8, § 4. The Appointing Authority also chooses
other personnel of commissions such as reporters, interpreters, security personnel,
FALL 2005] PRESIDENT'S MILITARY COMMISSIONS
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Commission Members serve a jury-like function of determining the
guilt of the accused in a military commission.3 Each Member must be
an officer in the U.S. Armed Forces.34 The Appointing Authority
must, at his discretion, choose at least three and no more than seven
members for each commission.35 The Appointing Authority must also
designate a Presiding Officer, whom must be a judge-advocate of any
of the Armed Forces, to preside over each commission.36 The primary
duties of the Presiding Officer include admitting and excluding
evidence at trial, regulating commission attorneys, ensuring
expeditious conduct of the trial, and certifying all interlocutory
questions for the Appointing Authority. 7 The Presiding Officer
supervises commission personnel in a quasi-judicial role during the
proceeding.38
In addition, the Appointing Authority must choose a Chief
Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel to oversee the prosecution
and defense of all commissions.39 The Chief Prosecutor must be a
judge advocate and must designate one or more judge advocates as
Detailed Prosecutors to each commission.' Similarly, the Chief
Defense Counsel must designate Detailed Defense Counsel for each
commission.4" The accused receives no funding toward civilian
attorneys, designated by the Commission Order as Civilian Defense
Counsel, and any civilian counsel procured must pass "Secret"
security clearance."
bailiffs, and clerks. Id.
33. Id. § 5(c).
34. Id. § 4(a)(3).
35. Id. § 4.
36. Id. § 4(a)(4). Judge Advocates are military lawyer-officers who work in all areas
of law including prosecuting and defending trials by courts-martial, advising commanders
of the laws of war, and general military business.
37. Id. § 4(a)(5). All issue certification is at the discretion of the Presiding Officer.
38. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 4(a)(5).
39. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), (c)(1).
40. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), (c)(1). Prosecutors must be either judge advocates or special trial
counsel of the Department of Justice made available by the Attorney General of the
United States. Id. § 4(b)(2).
41. Id. § 4(c)(2).
42. Id. § 4(c)(3)(a), (b).
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HI. Secret Evidence in the Military Commissions
A. Protected Information and Closure of Proceedings
In American courts, the government generally has the power to
assert a privilege for military and state secrets. 3 Unlike absolute
communications privileges such as the attorney-client privilege, the
topical privileges for military and state secrets must be justified
instrumentally." The relevant inquiry is whether at the time of
request for the information, the government has an essential secrecy
interest in the information it seeks to repress. If the government
meets its burden, then it may withhold the information. The
government may do so by making a showing that the subject matter
of the information in question constitutes a military or state secret,
that the government has maintained its secrecy to date, and public
release of such information would have grave consequences for
national security.4' Examples of "military" secrets are specific combat
operations, new weapons designs, and knowledge of enemy plans.
The "state" secrets privilege is much more nebulous and lends itself
to abuse by the executive branch. 8 In fact, the Supreme Court has no
definitive precedent on the issue.49 As a safeguard to the opponent, a
trial court can probe the government's conduct between the time it
acquired the information and the time of the request to determine its
ruling.0
Commission Order provisions aimed at limiting the admissibility
of secure information make it likely that secret evidence will be used
in the commissions." The Commission Order provides that the
Presiding Officer may issue protective orders over certain
information including:
"(i) information classified or classifiable... (ii) information
protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; (iii)




46. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 43, § 8.2.
47. James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 884 (1966).
48. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 43, § 8.3.
49. Id.
50. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5722 (1992).
51. See Commission Order, supra note 8, §§ 6(d)(2)(i), (iv).
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information the disclosure of which may endanger the physical safety
of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective
witnesses; (iv) information concerning intelligence and law
enforcement sources, methods, or activities; or (v) information
concerning other national security interests.... 52
The methods of protecting evidence include: (1) deleting specific
items of protected information from documents available to the
accused; (2) substituting a portion or summary of the information for
such protected information; and/or (3) substituting a statement of
facts for the protected information. 3 In addition, the Presiding
Officer may close any proceeding to the accused for the above
reasons. None of this protected information can be admitted into
evidence if not presented to Detailed Defense Counsel. However, if
the protected information is not shown to Civilian Defense Counsel
or, more importantly, the accused, it can still be entered against the
accused with the approval of the Presiding Officer and the Chief
Prosecutor.5
The exclusion of the accused from certain proceedings and from
exposure to certain evidence constitutes a secret evidence provision.
Detailed Defense Counsel will be allowed to represent the accused in
proceedings where protected evidence will be presented to
Commission Members to weigh towards guilt to the extent possible
without the assistance of the accused in the proceeding.57 The accused
will suffer a tremendous disadvantage by not knowing key evidence
against him because Detailed Defense Counsel is sworn to secrecy on
the information received in closed proceedings and protected
information. The accused is unable to explain himself to Detailed
Defense Counsel and assist in his own defense. 9 On the one hand,
Detailed Defense Counsel is abreast of all the evidence against her
client. On the other hand, she cannot efficiently use the evidence by
asking her client questions pertaining to the evidence. Although the
evidence is not completely secret by definition, it seems to be creating
a similar effect. Furthermore, this process could lead to confusion and
52. Id. § 6(d)(5)(i).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 9.6(d)(5)(ii)
56. Id. § 9.6(b)(3).




waste of time by both sides.
B. Military and State Secrets
The provisions restricting the disclosure of evidence invoke the
military and state secrets privilege directly in the Commission Order.'
In civilian or military courts, if the judge is moved by the
government's showing and decides to allow the government to assert
one of these privileges, it is absolute.61 However, American courts
have almost unanimously held that in criminal trials the government
must either disclose the information to the accused or dismiss the
charges to which the information relates.62 Congress altered this rule
in the Classified Information Procedures Act in favor of a more
deferential position that allows the government to substitute
statements of relevant facts or summaries of the classified
information. 6 Thus, in American courts, evidence must be divulged
to the accused in one form or another or the charges emanating from
such evidence would be dismissed.
The Commission Order allows the type of evidence that is
admissible under CIPA - declassified summaries of evidence or
statements of relevant facts - but also allows secret evidence. The
prosecution is given the dual advantage of being able to assert the
state secrets privilege to keep sensitive information from the accused
and admit the privileged evidence against the accused. Under CIPA,
the prosecution can use summaries of evidence when the trial judge
finds that the defense can adequately mount a defense to such
evidence, but never allows the information to be used against the
accused without knowledge.6' Indeed, in the federal trial of one of the
men accused of bombing the World Trade Center in 1993, the
accused was given "declassified summaries of the accusations against
him."65 The trial judge can also strike testimony and dismiss charges
if the government loses the motion to use summary evidence and will
not fully disclose to the defense.66
60. Id. § 6(b).
61. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 43, § 8.5.1
62. Id.
63. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 10 U.S.C. § 435 (2005) [hereinafter
CIPA].
64. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 43, § 8.5.2
65. Elizabeth Amon, A Battle against Secret Evidence, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at
A12.
66. Id.
FALL 20051 PRESIDENT'S MILITARY COMMISSIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
There is no similar provision in the Commission Order giving the
Presiding Officer power to dismiss charges if he or she decides to
withhold evidence from the accused. The only standard for a
Presiding Officer to make the decision to allow certain evidence to be
released is "to the extent consistent with national security, law
enforcement interests and applicable law., 67  This standard is
extremely vague and broad. It also raises the question of what
"applicable law" means in a closed system of justice. Without the
benefit of the law of Military and State Secrets privileges nor rule
interpretations on Commission Order provisions, a Presiding Officer
must make these important decisions without proper guidance on his
or her boundaries, which could result in the withholding of too much
evidence or too little evidence from the accused.
V. Military Commission Barriers to Confrontation of Witnesses
A. Alternative Forms of Testimony
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent
part, that:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial.., to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." '
Since the Amendment was ratified, common law judges and
lawyers have regarded the opportunity of cross-examination of all
witnesses as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness
of testimony.6 Thus, in addition to the right to compel and be
confronted with witnesses, the Supreme Court has construed the
Sixth Amendment to guarantee the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses in American courts.7" As a policy matter, the right to
confront witnesses gives the defense an opportunity to attack the
credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the jury an opportunity
to test the veracity of the statements they make in court. The hearsay
rule protects the right to confront witnesses, forbidding out of court
statements, unless there is an exception that would allow the evidence
67. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(b).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
69. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 19 (5th ed. 1999).
70. MCCORMICK, supra note 69, § 19
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to be used for its truth.71
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme
Court enhanced Confrontation Clause protection of the accused,
holding that all testimonial evidence must face cross-examination in
order to be admissible against the accused at trial . Crawford set
forth a bright-line rule that construes the Confrontation Clause to
protect the rights of the accused from testimonial evidence not tested
as to veracity. This rule extends to police interrogations, grand jury
testimony, and other testimonial devices.73 The Crawford Court
reasoned that testimony that was not cross-examined did not give the
accused an adequate opportunity to confront his accusers, which the
Constitution demands. The Court reasoned further that the
"principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.,
75
The Commission Order provision allowing testimony by
telephone, audiovisual or "other means" runs counter to the Supreme
Court reasoning in Crawford.76  First, allowing testimony by
telephone makes it difficult for commission Members to adequately
assess the veracity of statements made by witnesses. From counsel's
standpoint, it could be difficult or impossible for follow-up questions
to be pursued by the parties. For instance, if the rules are construed
to mean these types of testimony will not be cross-examined or will be
pre-recorded, then neither party will have adequate opportunity to
impeach testimony. In addition, the "other means" prong leaves a
question mark on what other forms of testimony might be used.' The
Commission Order does not clarify what forms of testimony this
provision was intended to cover.78 These rules will make it difficult
for both sides to combat adverse testimony and to confront witnesses
and evidence on both sides.
As a safeguard to the problems resulting from alternative forms
of testimony, the Commission Order states that the Members must
consider the ability to test the veracity of the testimony in giving the
71. See FED. R. EVID. 801,802.
72. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
73. Id. at 68.
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. Id. at 50.
76. Id.
77. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(d)(2)(iv).
78. Id.
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evidence its weight.79 However, a Member could find it extremely
difficult to ignore compelling evidence in some unusual form that
cannot be cross-examined. Asking Members to weigh evidence when
its veracity cannot be tested places them in a difficult position. These
problems may lead to convictions and acquittals supported by
unreliable evidence.
B. Anonymous Witnesses
Both sides will face tremendous difficulty confronting witnesses
testifying without knowing who the witnesses are. Anonymous
witnesses present a problem the Confrontation Clause was designed
to solve. That is, the Confrontation Clause protects the accused from
the use of anonymous witnesses by limiting the admission of hearsay
evidence at trial and by allowing for extensive cross-examination.'
Non-disclosure of witness identity severely limits the breadth of cross-
examination and the ability of the accused to test the veracity of the
witness' statements.8 These principles should apply to any set of trial
rules or criminal process because the underlying rationale as to why
we have these procedures is the same in any system: to guarantee the
trustworthiness and reliability of testimony.
American courts have rarely allowed even minor exercises of
anonymity.12 In Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931), the
Supreme Court held that disclosure of a witness' identity and address
were unequivocally required in a criminal trial, reasoning that
"prejudice ensues from a denial of opportunity to place the witness in
his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility
to a test."8'3 Using dicta in Smith v. Illinois, some lower courts have
loosened this requirement and refined it to allow witness anonymity in
situations where the prosecution can show actual threat to the witness
exists and fully discloses such threats to the trial judge." In these
courts, the trial judge must weigh the value of disclosure with witness
safety.85 Other trial courts remain fastened to the holding of Alford.86
79. Id. § 6.
80. See Nora V. Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity,
Disguise or Other Options?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 645 (1998).
81. Id. at 654-55.
82. Id. at 649.
83. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931).
84. Demleitner, supra note 80, at 652.
85. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6
86. Id.
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The Commission Order provides for the use of pseudonyms for
testimony in order to protect witnesses and evidence.87 Like secret
evidence, however, anonymous witnesses cannot be adequately tested
for veracity. The accused will not be able to assist counsel with
context specific responses to adverse testimony. Similarly, the
prosecution would have trouble finding out information about
anonymous defense witnesses that may suffer some bias. In both
cases, inquiries into the witness' true motivation for testifying would
be limited.88 Investigation into the background of the witness will be
severely limited as well.8 9 This includes finding facts like the witness'
connection to the accused, his or her criminal record and affiliations.
Thus, both attorneys would be limited in asking the witness questions
pertaining to past history, his or her reasons for testifying, and other
relevant questions that cut toward the veracity of his testimony.
VI. Evidence in the Military Commissions
A. Character Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, trial judges admit only
evidence that makes any "fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."' 9 This type of evidence is considered
relevant and generally admissible in court.9 ' However, not all
relevant evidence is admissible.9 The Federal Rules of Evidence
grant trial judges discretion to exclude even relevant evidence when
its probative value is outweighed by the probability that the jury will
use it prejudicially against the defendant, that its use will confuse the
jury, or its use will waste an inordinate amount time. 93 The risks
sought to be avoided by creating this balancing approach to relevance
in the Federal Rules range from "inducing decision on a purely
emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more harmful than
merely wasting time, at the other."94 In addition to the balancing
approach, there are also a number of specific rules of exclusion.
87. Id. § 6(d)(2)(iv).
88. Demleitner, supra note 80, at 652.
89. Id.
90. FED. R. EVID. 401.
91. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
92. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
93. Id.
94. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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One time-honored exclusion is that of character evidence.
Character evidence, generally, is not admissible to prove "action in
conformity therewith."'95 As the following excerpt illustrates, there
would be a great danger of injustice in trying the accused for evidence
of his character and not evidence bearing more directly on the
charges:
if the prosecution were allowed to go into such evidence, we
should have the whole life of the prisoner ripped up, and, as has
been witnessed elsewhere, upon a trial for murder you might
begin by shewing that when a boy at school the prisoner robbed
an orchard, and so on through his whole life; and the result
would be that the man on his trial might be overwhelmed by
prejudice, instead of being convicted on that affirmative
evidence which the law of this country requires. The evidence
is relevant to the issue, but is excluded for reasons of policy and
humanity; because, although by admitting it you might arrive at
justice in one case out of a hundred, you would probably do
injustice in the other ninety-nine. 96
Indeed, it would be difficult for jurors to objectively measure the
guilt of the accused for the specific crime charged if courts could
admit character evidence. Summing up this principle, the California
Law Revision Commission suggests that character evidence "tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of
fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because of
their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case
shows actually happened." 9
In spite of the foregoing pitfalls to the admission of character
evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide some limited
exceptions to its exclusion.98 The prosecution can enter evidence of
the bad character of the accused or the good character of the alleged
victim if the accused first enters evidence of his good character or the
bad character of the alleged victim: 9 This allows the prosecution to
rebut claims of self-defense and the victim's propensity for violence,
95. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
96. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57, at 1181 (quoting R. v. Rowton, Leigh & C., 169 Eng.
Rep. 1497,1506 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1865)).
97. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note (quoting Tentative
Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Art. VI.
Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility), Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. &
Studies, 657-658 (1964)).
98. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
99. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), (2).
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ensuring that such evidence is fairly viewed by the jury. In addition,
the prosecution can enter evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of
the defendant to prove other purposes such as "motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident."' ° This allows the prosecution to use what generally is
character evidence by definition to prove other elements of the crime
charged so long as the trial judge finds that the probative value of
such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the defendant."
The Commission Order, following the example of the trials of
seven Nazi saboteurs caught on American soil during World War II,"°2
creates a much lower standard for the admission of evidence than the
Federal Rules.' 3 A Presiding Officer must admit evidence, regardless
of prejudice or confusion, if he or she believes the evidence "would
have probative value to a reasonable person."'" This test for
admissibility removes the balancing approach to relevance, forcing
the Presiding Officer to admit even highly prejudicial evidence.' 5
With no counterweight to relevance like prejudice to the accused,
jury confusion, or waste of time, it is difficult for a Presiding Officer
to exclude any evidence in a commission because reasonable people
would probably find many prejudicial forms of evidence probative.
The Commission Order's general provision to admit evidence
that would have probative value to a reasonable person would
expressly allow the admission of character evidence. Unlike the
Federal and Military Rules of Evidence, which provide prosecutors
with leeway to enter character evidence that illustrates other
important aspects of the prosecution's case or to impeach defense
testimony, the Commission Order simply allows all relevant character
evidence into the trial.'O Thus, the accused has no safeguard against
character evidence entered by the prosecution except cross-
examination. Since the Commission Order allows written statements
and audiovisual testimony, cross-examination may frequently be
impossible. Furthermore, in a trial governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the jury would rarely examine such character evidence and
100. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
101. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
102. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), where the Supreme Court upheld trials by
military commission.
103. See Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(d)(1)..
104. Id.
105. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
106. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
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certainly could not use the evidence for its forbidden purpose, that is,
to weigh toward the guilt of the accused. Here, commission Members
would use character evidence to weigh toward the guilt of the
accused.
Attorney General John Ashcroft's argument that "we are at
war" and "foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the
United States ... are not entitled to the protections of the American
Constitution" does not justify such striking departures from relevance
determinations for several reasons.' 7 First, the military necessity
argument does not apply here. The U.S. Government has no pressing
need to create procedurally thin trials like those of Ex Parte Quirin
during World War II.1°  Having less structured rules of evidence
could actually make trials longer because both sides will use such a
wide range of evidence that the use of ex parte conferences will
increase in order to justify safety and protection measures. In
addition, more defense motions challenging the validity of rules such
as the omission of a character evidence provision will increase the
length of the trials. These motions will be difficult to decide without
guiding standards that centuries of law have produced.
B. Balancing Approach, Character Evidence Rule and Member Power to
Hear Evidence
Implementing a balancing approach to relevance in the
Commission Order would provide a Presiding Officer an opportunity
to balance the prejudicial effects of the evidence against its probative
value. 19 No character evidence or other specific form of prejudicial
evidence would be expressly excluded by the new provision."'
However, a Presiding Officer could exclude evidence that is too
prejudicial, confusing, or time consuming."' The probative value to a
reasonable person standard of admissibility would still present the
threshold question, but would have one important counterweight to
filter prejudicial, unneeded evidence.
Another measure that could improve the integrity of the
commissions is imposing a basic character evidence rule and
loosening it to allow character evidence in necessity situations. In
107. Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, White House Push on Security Steps Bypasses
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al.
108. See generally, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.





other words, character evidence would generally be excluded unless
the prosecution made a compelling showing that it is necessary. The
rules for prosecution of sex crimes in the United States provide an
example where "evidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible."" 2 Under Federal
Rules of Evidence 413 through 415, character evidence tending to
show the accused's past history as a sex criminal is not excluded.
Thus, the character evidence ban is lifted, but the judge can still
exclude highly prejudicial evidence under the balancing approach to
relevance .
According to Section 6(d)(1) of the Commission Order,
Members can request a vote overriding the decision of the Presiding
Officer to exclude evidence." ' If a majority of the Members vote to
admit, then the evidence is admitted whether or not the Presiding
Officer agrees."5 The Commission Order implies that all Members
will be present at hearings governing the admission of evidence.
16
This would mean that Members would have to ignore excluded
prejudicial evidence when deciding guilt of the accused. This would
be difficult for any person to do. For the same reasons the American
courts keep prejudicial evidence from juries when excluding it,
evidentiary decisions should always be made outside the presence of
the commission Members.
VII. Reforming the Military Commissions
A. Reforming the Current Commission Order
The ambiguity of the Commission Order plagues many of its
provisions. Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence and American case
precedent, the Commission Order provisions lack legislative intent
and background information as to rationale for the provisions and
their expected use. Both prosecutors and defense counsel possess
tremendous leeway to enter prejudicial evidence and appeal to safety
and security concerns during trial."7 The Commission Order does not
limit or abridge this grant of power except through the discretion of
112. FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
113. See generally, id.
114. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(d)(1).
115. Id. § 6(d)(1).
116. Id.
117. See id. § 6(d)(2).
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the Presiding Officer."8 However, the Commission Order fails to
provide important standards for the Presiding Officer to use in
making discretionary decisions. The task of admitting evidence
becomes amorphous when there are unlimited types of evidence and
unlimited substitutions for testimony without a framework of guiding
principles."9 At the same time, Presiding Officers lack discretion to
exclude prejudicial evidence.'20 The only test for admission is the
probative value to reasonable person standard, which is subject to
many interpretations. 2' Finally, the Members of a commission can
overrule nearly any evidentiary determination of a Presiding Officer,
thereby undermining his or her authority and control over the case.
Setting more specific standards for when anonymous witnesses
can be used would provide the Presiding Officer with guidelines to
look to when deciding these issues. Presumably it would be highly
difficult to balance the concerns set forth for safety and security of
information and the need for confrontation of adverse witnesses.
One possible standard could be that witnesses can remain anonymous
when in the opinion of the Presiding Officer the witness's safety
cannot be preserved or national security would be irreparably injured.
This policy would provide the Presiding Officer a specific standard to
apply in hearings regarding anonymous witnesses. These guidelines
would create more consistent results where extremely high-risk
witnesses remain anonymous while all others may be cross-examined.
B. Alternate Forums and Options for Trying Detainees
One alternate option is to hold the trials of suspected terrorists in
the U.S. District Courts. District Court trials would provide
American constitutional safeguards for the accused, but would also
lack many of the national security protections sought by the Bush
Administration. Additionally, the political climate and nature of the
charges may weigh in favor of keeping these trials out of American
courts for many reasons, including safety of courts and participants,
protection of military secrets and juror bias. Furthermore, al Qaida
detainees and their compatriots are not American citizens. For these
reasons, such trials do not present a viable option.
Another solution is to modify the current commissions to include
important protections for the accused without fully applying the rules
of American courts. This solution is probably the most acceptable to
118. See generally id.
119. Id. § 6(d)(2).
120. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(d)(2).
121. Id. § 6(d)(1).
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the Bush Administration, whose primary concern is national security.
The Bush Administration could still maintain the commissions with
their attendant security and information-gathering capabilities, but
the commissions would have more legitimacy because they would be
based on time-tested rules and procedures respected around the
world for fairness. This solution could include a general prohibition
of the use of character evidence in detainee trials without a
compelling necessity. In addition, providing the Presiding Officer
more standards to use in making discretionary decisions would limit
the admission of untested evidence. Furthermore, a specific standard
for when secret evidence and anonymous witnesses can be used
would increase the procedural integrity of the trials.
The most effective solution for the Bush Administration is to
adopt the courts-martial trial from the military courts. This solution
would quell critics calling for international tribunals, which have
major problems of their own, and media-hyped federal district court
trials for the detainees. The Bush Administration could argue that it
is providing more than what is required by international law, the 1949
Geneva Convention, since the detainees are arguably not prisoners-
of-war. Furthermore, the Government could argue that although it
cannot risk an international tribunal and its possible security
repercussions, it has provided the enemy a time-honored "full and
fair" trial.22  This option would demonstrate the Bush
Administration's commitment to the rule of law in the face of
inhumane and irrational terrorist behavior.
VIII. Conclusion
Over half a century after the trial of seven Nazi saboteurs in
Washington, D.C., the Bush Administration created military
commissions to try those responsible for the terror attacks. Though
legal standards of justice have changed, the standards proposed for
the commissions do not comport with some of the most important
American standards for the admission of evidence and the
confrontation of witnesses in trials. As a world leader in the
administration of justice and the preservation of rights, the United
States cannot afford to set this precedent.
American courts offer American citizens extensive safeguards in
an attempt to ensure that innocent people are exculpated. Inevitably,
some guilty of heinous crimes will walk free. And some innocent
122. Commission Order, supra note 8, § 6(b)(1).
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people are unjustly incarcerated. However, what makes the
American system of criminal justice exemplary and worthy of
emulation is that it offers the same protections and procedures to
each individual charged with a crime. Thus, to offer the detainees
legal standards and process commensurate with the notions of justice
that have made this country great would not weaken our mission to
ferret out terrorism, but strengthen it. Countries would be less likely
to denounce our treatment of these individuals and more likely to
assist in their capture abroad. Extradition of terror suspects would
occur more easily. Verdicts from these courts would be respected and
celebrated rather than derided. The alternative, to conduct trials
reminiscent of a past era, deals our reverence for the rule of law a
major defeat.
